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“5.6 Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.”
“5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)
1 Introduction
Unawareness refers to lack of conception rather than to lack of information. In standard
models of incomplete information, decision makers share the conception of the interactive
decision problem but may have asymmetric information. While models of asymmetric
information are common in game theory and economics, the modelling of unawareness
in interactive decision making proves to be a tricky task. Modica and Rustichini (1994)
and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) showed that standard state-space models of
asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness.
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a) introduced a generalized state-space model that
allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of
knowledge. Such an unawareness structure involves a lattice of state-spaces, ordered
according to their expressive power. If individual i considers as possible states in a
space with low expressive power, this means that she is unaware of aspects of reality not
expressible in that space. If in these states another individual j considers as possible only
states in an even lower space of the lattice, it means that i thinks that j is unaware of
some aspects of reality of which i is aware. This is how mutual beliefs about unawareness
are captured in the model.
In this paper we substantiate this construction with logical building blocks. Such an
investigation of foundations is indeed necessary. Any structure for modeling asymmetric
cognition – even if it has the desired properties – begs the question whether the model
itself should not be an object for further uncertainties of the individuals. One way to
show that a model is comprehensive is to describe in minute detail the beliefs and mutual
beliefs of all individuals in each state. If each relevant combination of such beliefs are
described in some state of the model, then we are convinced that the phenomena we aim
at modeling is captured by our construction.
For the case of knowledge and mutual knowledge, such a detailed substantiation of the
beliefs in the standard partition model has been carried out by constructing the canonical
model of all maximally-consistent sets of formulas in the S5 system of epistemic logic
(Aumann, 1999). This is the standard propositional logic (with negations, conjunctions
and disjunctions of formulas), augmented with a knowledge modality for each individual:
For each formula ϕ and each individual i, there is also a formula kiϕ (“individual i
knows ϕ”). The axioms of the system then specify (on top of the standard logical
tautologies) that what an individual knows is true, and that the individual knows what
she knows and what she ignores. The canonical construction in which the states are
the maximally-consistent sets of formulas in this logical system turns to have a natural
partition structure, and the knowledge of events in this partition model reflects exactly
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the knowledge of formulas in the states. That’s how the canonical model is substantiated
by the internal structure of its own states.
In this paper we aim at an analogous foundation for the case of unawareness. Two
main differences arise.
First, the axiom system has to be amended: An individual knows that she doesn’t
know some fact only if she is aware of that fact. Our axiom system manifests this feature.
It is a multi-person extension of a (variant) of the axiom system proposed by Modica
and Rustichini (1999).
Second, in the lattice of spaces of an unawareness structure, only the states in the
upper-most space are full descriptions of all aspects of reality relevant to the interaction
among the individuals. States in lower spaces are subjective portraits of situations, in
the mind of individuals who are unaware of some of these relevant dimensions. Therefore,
to construct these subjective descriptions, one has to use a sub-language, with a proper
subset of the primitive propositions of the logical syntax.
With these modifications done, we are able to accomplish our mission: The collec-
tions of maximally-consistent sets of formulas (across all sub-languages) constitute an
unawareness structure (Theorem 1), in which knowledge of events reflects exactly the
knowledge of formulas in states (Theorem 2).
This result entails an important corollary. Logicians are often interested whether an
axiom system is sound and complete with respect to a given family of models. Soundness
means that every theorem derivable from the axioms obtains in all states of all these
models. Completeness means the reverse implication: Every formula that obtains in all
states of all the models in the family is provable from the axioms of the system. Our
results imply that the axiom system we devised is sound and complete with respect to
the family of unawareness structures (Theorem 3).1
The caveat here is that each space in the lattice of an unawareness structure is asso-
ciated with a sub-language (determined by a subset of the primitive propositions), and
that higher spaces in the lattice are associated with richer sub-languages. In a state
which is a subjective description of reality in the mind of an individual who is unaware
of a primitive proposition ϕ, neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ obtain. If one were to insist on a truth
value for ϕ in such a state, it would have to be “mu” – a third value, distinct than “true”
and “false”. In this sense, our logic is 3-valued.
In a parallel work, Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) propose another sound and complete
axiomatization for our unawareness structures. It is a multi-person version of an ax-
iomatization formulated in Halpern (2001) for the single-person case, an axiomatization
which he showed to be equivalent to that of Modica and Rustichini (1999).2 Halpern and
1In fact, even strong soundness and completeness are implied: A set of formulas Γ is consistent (that
is, free of contradiction) if and only if there is a state in a model in which Γ obtains.
2The logic in both Halpern (2001) and Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) is somewhat more involved, because
it has two knowledge operators – implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. It is the latter which
corresponds to the unique knowledge operator in Modica and Rustichini (1999) and in the current work.
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Reˆgo’s (2005) result implies that both their axiomatization and ours are sound and com-
plete with respect to unawareness structures, and hence are equivalent to one another.
Overall, this shows the connections between the axiomatizations in the following table.3
 
 
 
equivalence 
single person 
 
 
Modica and Rustichini 
(1999) 
Halpern (2001) 
 
generalization  
multi person 
 
 
current paper Halpern and Rêgo  (2005) 
 
Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) also formalize the sense in which our class of unawareness
structures is equivalent to a multi-person version of a sub-class of awareness structures
proposed by Fagin and Halpern (1988).4 This complements the result in Halpern (2001),
in which he showed, for the single-person case, a similar equivalence between the gen-
eralized state-spaces of Modica and Rustichini (1999) and a sub-class of Fagin-Halpern
(1988) awareness structures.
The literature on unawareness is expanding. Li (2006a) proposed set-theoretic models
of unawareness, both for the single-person and for the multi-person case. It is still open
whether these models are equivalent to those of Modica and Rustichini (1999) or Heifetz,
Meier and Schipper (2006a), respectively. Feinberg (2004, 2005) devised a logic to address
3Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) propose also a second axiomatization which is sound and complete with
respect to our unawareness structures. In that axiomatization the langauge is augmented with a non-
standard implication operator ↪→. The formula ϕ ↪→ ψ stands for “ϕ→ ψ, and ψ is at least as defined
as ϕ”. Next, they define the formulas “ϕ = 1”, “ϕ = 0” and “ϕ = 12” (standing for ϕ is true,
false, undefined, respectively) as abbreviations of other formulas involving the non-standard implication
operator ↪→. Each of the formulas “ϕ = 1”, “ϕ = 0” and “ϕ = 12” does have a standard, dichotomic
truth a value in all states, including states in spaces of the lattice in which ϕ itself is undefined. In
particular, in states in which ϕ is neither true nor false, the new formula ϕ = 12 is true (while the
formulas ϕ = 1, ϕ = 0 are false). This enables Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) to talk indirectly but explicitly
about the 3-valued truth value of each formula in each state.
4Halpern and Reˆgo (2005) establish similar equivalence results also for versions of our unawareness
structures in which individuals’ knowledge operator has weaker properties, allowing for delusion, or the
lack of introspection even of propositions of which the individual is aware.
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unawareness and mutual unawareness in games. The precise connection with the logics
in the above table is still to be explored.
Unawareness in strategic-form games and Bayesian games is analyzed in Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2006b), Cˇopicˇ and Galeotti (2006) and Sadzik (2006). Heifetz, Meier and
Schipper (2006b), as well as Ewerhart (2001) and Galanis (2006) discuss the possibility
of agreement and trade under unawareness. Unawareness in extensive-form games is
analyzed in Halpern and Reˆgo (2006) and Li (2006b). Ozbay (2006), Filiz (2006), Zhen
(2006) and Zhao (2006) apply unawareness to particular strategic settings.
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the syntax and axioms.
In Section 3 we construct the canonical model and show its fundamental properties
(Theorems 1 and 2). Soundness and Completeness are shown in Section 4 (Theorem
3). For the reader’s convenience we collect all properties of unawareness structures in
Appendix A. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Syntax and Axioms
Let X be the nonempty set of atomic formulas or primitive propositions, and let I be the
set of individuals. We assume I to be nonempty, but otherwise no restriction is imposed
(so I could be infinite, even uncountable).
The syntax is the usual multi-person modal syntax with knowledge modalities ki,
“negation” ¬, “and” ∧ and a constant > for truth. As usual, ∨, →, and ←→ are
abbreviations, defined in the usual way: if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then ϕ∨ψ := ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ),
(ϕ → ψ) := (¬ϕ ∨ ψ), and (ϕ ←→ ψ) := (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). Primitive propositions
represent natural occurrences such as “tomorrow is payday” that are not themselves
described either in terms of individuals knowing something, or as combinations of other
natural occurrences using propositional connectives.
The set of formulas L is the smallest set such that:
• > is a formula,
• every x ∈ X is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula, then ¬ϕ is a formula,
• if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then ϕ ∧ ψ is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula, then kiϕ is a formula.
The awareness modality is defined by
aiϕ := kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ
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and the unawareness modality is defined by
uiϕ := ¬aiϕ.
An individual’s awareness of a formula is defined as the individual knowing the formula
or knowing that she doesn’t know the formula. An individual’s unawareness of a formula
is defined as not being aware of the formula.
For a formula ϕ of our language, define Pr (ϕ) to be the set of primitive propositions
occurring in ϕ. More precise, define inductively:
Pr (>) := ∅,
Pr (x) := {x} , for x ∈ X,
Pr (¬ϕ) := Pr (ϕ) ,
Pr (ϕ ∧ ψ) := Pr (ϕ) ∪ Pr (ψ) ,
Pr (kiϕ) := Pr (ϕ) .
Let α be a subset of X. Then Lα := {ϕ ∈ L | Pr (ϕ) ⊆ α}. That is, Lα is the sub-
language of L consisting of those formulas in which only primitive propositions in α
occur.
An axiom is a formula assumed. An inference rule consists of hypotheses and the
conclusion (e.g. see Modus Ponens below). An axiom system is a collection of axioms
and inference rules. The axiom system S5 (see for example Chellas, 1980, pp. 14 or
Fagin et al. 1995, p. 56) corresponds to standard partitional models usually applied in
economics. This axiom system is weakened to the following system:
• All substitution instances of valid formulas of Propositional Calculus, including the
formula >, (PC)
• the inference rule Modus Ponens :
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
, (MP)
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiϕ→ ϕ, (T)
• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiϕ→ kikiϕ. (4)
• the Propositional Awareness axioms :
1. aiϕ ←→ ai¬ϕ,
2. aiϕ ∧ aiψ ←→ ai (ϕ ∧ ψ) ,
3. aiϕ ←→ aikjϕ, for j ∈ I.
(PA)
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• and the inference rule RK-Inference: For all natural numbers n ≥ 1: If ϕ1, ϕ2, ...,
ϕn and ϕ are formulas such that Pr (ϕ) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Pr (ϕi) then
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn → ϕ
kiϕ1 ∧ kiϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ kiϕn → kiϕ. (RK)
A tautology is a valid formula of Propositional Calculus.
Definition 1 The set of theorems is the smallest set of formulas that contain all the
axioms (that is all the substitution instances of valid formulas of Propositional Calculus,
Truth, the Propositional Awareness Axioms and Axiom (4)) and that is closed under the
inference rules Modus Ponens and RK-Inference.
Definition 2 Let Γ be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula. A proof of ϕ from Γ is a
finite sequence of formulas such that the last formula is ϕ and such that each formula is
a formula in Γ, a theorem of the system or inferred from the previous formulas by Modus
Ponens. If there is a proof of ϕ from Γ, then we write Γ ` ϕ. In particular, ` ϕ means
that ϕ is a theorem. If Γ ` ϕ, we say that Γ implies ϕ syntactically.
Definition 3 As set Γ of formulas is consistent if and only if there is no formula ϕ such
that Γ ` ϕ and Γ ` ¬ϕ. As set Γ of formulas is inconsistent, if it is not consistent.
RK-inference implies immediately (since ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ and ϕ ∧ ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ) are
instances of tautologies of the Propositional Calculus) that the following are theorems:
kiϕ ∧ ki (ϕ→ ψ)→ kiψ (K)
and
kiϕ ∧ kiψ → ki (ϕ ∧ ψ) . (C)
Below, the derived inference rule Conjunction is implied by applying twice the in-
ference rule Modus Ponens of the Propositional Calculus to instances of the tautology
p→ (q → (p ∧ q)):
ϕ, ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ.
By applying twice the inference rule Modus Ponens of the Propositional Calculus
to instances of the tautology (p→ q) → ((q → r)→ (p→ r)), we obtain the derived
inference rule Implication:
ϕ→ ψ, ψ → χ
ϕ→ χ .
Since ki¬ki¬kiϕ → ai¬kiϕ is a theorem and since ai¬kiϕ → aiϕ follows from the
propositional awareness axioms, ki¬ki¬kiϕ→ aiϕ is a theorem:
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Remark 1 The propositional awareness axioms imply the following weakening of the
usual Axiom (5):5
uiϕ→ ¬ki¬ki¬kiϕ (5’)
or equivalently
ki¬ki¬kiϕ→ aiϕ. (5”)
The positive introspection axiom implies introspection of awareness:
Proposition 1 Axiom (4) implies
aiϕ→ kiaiϕ.
Next, we formulate the Lemma on propositional awareness:
Lemma 1 Let ϕ be a formula. Then, the following is a theorem:
aiϕ↔
∧
x∈Pr(ϕ)
aix.
The Lemma says that individual i is aware of a formula if and only if she is aware of
all primitive propositions in this formula.
The following proposition says that the following weaker form of the standard infer-
ence rule Necessitation obtains: Whenever an individual is aware of a theorem, then he
knows that theorem:
Proposition 2 If ϕ is a theorem, then aiϕ→ kiϕ is theorem and hence {aiϕ} ` kiϕ.
3 The Canonical Unawareness Structure
In Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a) we proposed how to model mutual unawareness
with unawareness structures. The definition of unawareness structures is recalled in
Appendix A.
Where do unawareness structures come from? What properties of knowledge and
awareness do they capture? And can one model by unawareness structures all situations
with such properties?
In this section we shall approach these questions by using the logical apparatus from
section 2. “Properties” will be expressed by formulas of the syntax defined there; a “sit-
uation” will be a description of properties (a set of formulas) which is both consistent in
5We are grateful to Joe Halpern for pointing this out.
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the system (i.e. does not entail a contradiction), and comprehensive (i.e., for each poten-
tial property of knowledge and awareness, the description contains either the property
or its negation).
We shall show that the collection of all such descriptions of situations does indeed
constitute an unawareness structure (Theorem 1 below). This unawareness structure is
called the canonical unawareness structure. Any formula that belongs to some state of
the canonical structure, and expresses knowledge or awareness, is mirrored accurately by
a corresponding property of knowledge or awareness of events in the structure, a property
that obtains in that state (Theorem 2 below).
In short, the canonical unawareness structure consists of all the consistent and compre-
hensive descriptions of mutual knowledge and awareness, and these explicit descriptions
are reflected by the knowledge and awareness operators on events in this structure. This
substantiates the use of unawareness structures by providing an adequate foundation,
and addresses the questions posed at the beginning of this section.
We now proceed with the formal definition of the canonical unawareness structure.
Recall that X is the set of primitive propositions. For a subset α ⊆ X, let Ωα be the set of
maximally consistent sets ωα of formulas in the sub-language Lα, that is, ωα is consistent
and for every formula ϕ ∈ Lα\ωα, the set ωα ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent. Let Ω =
⋃
α⊆X Ωα.
We define Ωβ  Ωα whenever β ⊆ α.
This makes {Ωα}α⊆X into a complete lattice of spaces. To complete its definition as
the canonical unawareness structure, we proceed by defining the projections among the
spaces and the possibility correspondences of individuals. To this end, we start with a
pair of lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let α ⊆ X and Γ ⊆ Lα. If Γ is a consistent subset of Lα then it can be
extended to a maximally consistent subset ωα of Lα.
The following lemma can be proved along the lines of Chellas (1980, Theorem 2.18).
Lemma 3 Let α ⊆ X and Γ ⊆ Lα. Then Γ is a maximally consistent subset of Lα if
and only if
(i) Γ is consistent, and
(ii) for every formula ϕ ∈ Lα: ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
If Ωα  Ωβ (i.e., α ⊇ β) we define a projection
rαβ : Ωα −→ Ωβ
by
rαβ (ω) := ω ∩ Lβ.
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Proposition 3 The projection rαβ is well-defined and surjective.
Remark 2 If α ⊇ β ⊇ γ then rαγ = rβγ ◦ rαβ .
For every formula ϕ, denote
[ϕ] := {ω ∈ Ω : ϕ ∈ ω} .
The following lemma can be proved along the lines of Chellas (1980, Theorem 2.18).
Lemma 4 Let ω ∈ Ωα for some α ⊆ X. Then ω is closed under inferences in the
following sense:
1. If ϕ is a theorem such that ϕ ∈ Lα, then ϕ ∈ ω.
2. If ϕ ∈ ω and ϕ→ ψ is a theorem such that ψ ∈ Lα, then ψ ∈ ω.
3. If ϕ1, ..., ϕn ∈ ω, then
∧n
i=1 ϕi ∈ ω.
Proposition 4 [ϕ] is an event.
Definition 4 For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I define the possibility set
Πi(ω) =
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : For every formula ϕ (i) kiϕ ∈ ω implies ϕ ∈ ω
′
(ii) aiϕ ∈ ω iff (ϕ ∈ ω′ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′)
}
.
Definition 5 For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I define α (ω, i) := {x ∈ X | ai (x) ∈ ω}.
Proposition 5 For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I we have ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) ∈ Πi (ω).
Theorem 1 For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I, Πi (ω) is nonempty and satisfies the properties
0. - 5. of a possibility correspondence.
By Remark 2, Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 it follows that
Corollary 1 The tuple
Ω :=
〈
(Ωα)α⊆X ,
(
rαβ
)
β⊆α⊆X , (Πi)i∈I
〉
,
is an unawareness structure for the set of individuals I.
The definition of the canonical unawareness structure is hence complete. We now
proceed to show that the internal structure of its states is indeed reflected by operations
on events in the structure. In particular, knowledge as expressed in syntactic terms
within a state (kiϕ) gets translated to knowledge of the corresponding event (Ki [ϕ]).
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Theorem 2 For ϕ ∈ L, we have
[¬ϕ] = ¬ [ϕ] ,
[ϕ ∧ ψ] = [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] ,
[kiϕ] = Ki [ϕ] .
Corollary 2 For ϕ ∈ L, we have Ai [ϕ] = [aiϕ] and Ui [ϕ] = [uiϕ].
4 Semantics, Soundness and Completeness
In this section we have to show how the canonical unawareness structure manifests that
our axiom system is strongly sound and strongly complete with respect the family of
unawareness structures. Strong soundness means that if a formula ϕ is provable from a
set of formulas Γ (with the same set of atomic propositions as in ϕ), then ϕ obtains in all
states of all unawareness structures in which Γ obtains. Strong completeness means the
reverse implication: If ϕ obtains in all states of all unawareness structures in which such
a Γ obtains, then ϕ is provable from Γ. Strong soundness and strong completeness is thus
another way to formulate the sense in which the axiom system provides a foundation and
substantiates the notion of an unawareness structure.
We now proceed with the formal definitions and analysis. If Σ is an unawareness
structure, then, since the lattice is complete, there exists a state space M (Σ), such that
for all other state spaces S, we do have S M (Σ). Note that for every event E it follows
that S (E) M (Σ).
We have to define what it means for a formula “to obtain” in a state. To this end we
define below the notions of an evaluation function and a model.
For an unawareness structure Σ let E be the collection of events. A function v :
X −→ E is called an evaluation function. The set v(x) is the event at which the primitive
proposition x obtains.
Definition 6 For a nonempty set X of primitive propositions, an unawareness model is
a pair Σv := (Σ, v), where Σ is an unawareness structure and v an evaluation function.
If no confusion can arise, with some abuse of notation, we sometimes write Σ instead of
Σv.
Definition 7 For a nonempty set X of primitive propositions and a set I of players,
let (Σ, v) be an unawareness model, and let s ∈ S for some S ∈ S. Then we define by
induction on the formation of the formulas in L:
• (Σ, s) |= >, for all s ∈ Σ,
• (Σ, s) |= x, if s ∈ v (x),
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• (Σ, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ, if s ∈ [ϕ] ∩ [ψ],
• (Σ, s) |= ¬ϕ, if s ∈ ¬ [ϕ],
• (Σ, s) |= ki (ϕ) , if s ∈ Ki [ϕ],
where [ψ] := {s′ ∈ Σ | (Σ, s′) |= ψ} , for every formula ψ.
Note that [ψ] is an event, for every formula ψ. Note also that if ϕ is a formula, S ′ a
state space such that S ([ϕ])  S ′, and s a state in S ′, then we have neither (Σ, s)  ϕ
nor (Σ, s)  ¬ϕ. However, for states s in the upmost state space M (Σ), we always have
either (Σ, s)  ϕ or (Σ, s)  ¬ϕ, for every ϕ ∈ L. We say that a formula ϕ is defined in
state s in the unawareness model Σ if s ∈ ∩x∈Pr(ϕ) (v (x) ∪ ¬v (x)). It is easy to see that
ϕ is defined in state s if and only if s ∈ [ϕ] ∨ [¬ϕ].
Definition 8 We say ϕ is true in state s, if (Σ, s) |= ϕ. For a set of formulas Γ, we
say that Γ is true in state s, if (Σ, s) |= ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Γ.
Definition 9 For Γ ⊆ L, we say that Γ has a model if there is an unawareness model
Σ and a state s ∈ Σ such that (Σ, s) |= Γ.
The canonical structure becomes a model with the valuation function v that associates
with every primitive proposition x the set of states to which x belongs.
Definition 10 For x ∈ X define vΩ (x) := {ω ∈ Ω | x ∈ ω}.
In the canonical model Ω, the properties of the canonical model make each state ω
in it a model of all the formulas that ω contains.
Corollary 3 The pair
(
Ω, vΩ
)
is an unawareness model such that for all ϕ ∈ L :
(Ω, ω) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ω.(
Ω, vΩ
)
is called the canonical unawareness model.
Now we define a notion of semantic implication within an unawareness model.
Definition 11 Let Σ be an unawareness model. If Γ is a set of formulas and ϕ is a
formula, we write Γ |=Σ ϕ if for every state s ∈ ∩x∈Pr(ϕ) (v (x) ∪ ¬v (x)) we have that
(Σ, s) |= Γ implies (Σ, s) |= ϕ.
Definition 12 We write Γ |= ϕ if for every unawareness model Σ we have Γ |=Σ ϕ. In
this case, we say that Γ implies ϕ semantically. Accordingly, we write |= ϕ if it is the
case that ∅ |= ϕ. We say that ϕ is valid, if |= ϕ.
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It follows that a formula is valid if and only if it is true in all states in which it is defined.
Lemma 5 Let Σ be an unawareness model. Then Γ |=Σ ϕ iff for all s ∈M (Σ) : (Σ, s) |=
Γ implies (Σ, s) |= ϕ.
Definition 13 The system of axioms and inference rules is strongly sound (with respect
to the class of unawareness models) if for every set of formulas Γ and every formula ϕ
we have that Γ ` ϕ implies Γ |= ϕ.
Soundness means that every formula that follows from axioms and inference rules, i.e.
that is a theorem, is true in all states in all unawareness structures where this formula
is defined. Strong soundness means that semantic implication follows from syntactic
implication. Strong soundness is equivalent to that every set of formulas that is true in
some state of some unawareness structure is consistent.
Proposition 6 The system is strongly sound with respect to the class of unawareness
models.
Definition 14 The system of axioms and inference rules is strongly complete (with
respect to the class of unawareness models) if for every set of formulas Γ and every
formula ϕ, we have that Γ |= ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ.
Completeness means that every formula that is true in all states in all spaces where
it is defined is a theorem. Strong completeness means that syntactic implication follows
from semantic implication. Strong completeness is equivalent to that every consistent set
of formulas is true in some state in some unawareness structure.
Now, we can prove the strong characterization Theorem:
Theorem 3 (Strong soundness and strong completeness) For Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L,
we have Γ ` ϕ if and only if Γ |= ϕ. Furthermore, Γ ` ϕ if and only if in the canonical
unawareness model Ω, for every ω ∈ Ωα such that Pr (ϕ) ⊆ α, we have that (Ω, ω) |= Γ
implies (Ω, ω) |= ϕ.
Corollary 4 A set of formulas is consistent if and only if it has a model.
In the entire analysis above, the notion of a proof of ϕ from Γ allowed for using, along
the proof, formulas with atomic propositions neither in ϕ nor in Γ. With Theorem 3 in
hand, we can now refine this notion, and show that Theorem 3 obtains, in fact, even if
the notion of proof does not involve formulas outside the sub-language of ϕ and Γ. To
this end, we start with several definitions.
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Definition 15 Let Y be a set of primitive propositions. The set of LY−theorems is the
smallest set of formulas in LY that contain all the axioms (that is all the substitution
instances of valid formulas of Propositional Calculus, Truth, the Propositional Awareness
Axioms and Axiom (4)) and that is closed under instances of the inference rules Modus
Ponens and RK-Inference which mention only formulas in LY .
Definition 16 Let Y be a set of primitive propositions, let Γ be a set of formulas
in LY and ϕ a formula in LY . An LY−proof of ϕ from Γ is a finite sequence of
LY−formulas such that the last formula is ϕ and such that each formula is a formula in
Γ, an LY−theorem or inferred from the previous formulas by an instance of Modus Po-
nens with formulas in LY . If there is an LY−proof of ϕ from Γ, then we write Γ `LY ϕ.
In particular, `LY ϕ means that ϕ is an LY−theorem.
Definition 17 Let Y be a set of primitive propositions. As set of formulas Γ ⊆ LY
is LY−consistent if and only if there is no formula ϕ ∈ LY such that Γ `LY ϕ and
Γ `LY ¬ϕ. A set Γ ⊆ LY of formulas is LY−inconsistent, if it is not LY−consistent.
With these definitions, we have:
Proposition 7 Let Y ⊇ Z be sets of primitive propositions and let Γ ⊆ LZ. Then Γ is
LZ-consistent if and only if Γ is LY -consistent.
Corollary 5 Let Y ⊆ X and let Γ ⊆ LY and ϕ ∈ LY . Then we have Γ `LY ϕ if and only
if Γ |= ϕ. Furthermore, this is the case if and only if in the canonical unawareness model
Ω, for every ω ∈ Ωα such that Pr (ϕ) ⊆ α, we have that (Ω, ω) |= Γ implies (Ω, ω) |= ϕ.
Appendices
A Unawareness Structures
In this appendix we recall the definition of unawareness structures in Heifetz, Meier and
Schipper (2006a), adapted to the notation used in this article.
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint state spaces, with a partial order
 on S. Denote by Σ = ⋃
α∈A Sα the union of these spaces.
For every S and S ′ such that S ′  S, there is a surjective projection rS′S : S ′ → S,
where rSS is the identity. Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal to
the cardinality of S ′. We require the projections to commute: If S ′′  S ′  S then
rS
′′
S = r
S′
S ◦ rS′′S′ . If s ∈ S ′, denote sS = rS′S (s). If B ⊆ S ′, denote BS = {sS : s ∈ B}.
Denote g(S) = {S ′ : S ′  S}. For B ⊆ S, denote B↑ = ⋃S′∈g(S) (rS′S )−1 (B).
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An event is a pair (E, S), where E = B↑ with B ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. B is called
the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is uniquely
determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅S
for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Σ is an event.
If (B↑, S) is an event where B ⊆ S, the negation ¬(B↑, S) of (B↑, S) is defined by
¬(B↑, S) := ((S \ B)↑, S). Abusing notation, we write ¬B↑ := (S \ B)↑. Note that by
our notational convention, we have¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. ¬B↑
is typically a proper subset of the complement Σ \B↑ . That is, (S \B)↑ $ Σ \B↑ . Thus
our structure is not a standard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman, and
Rustichini (1998).
If
{(
B↑λ, Sλ
)}
λ∈L
is a set of events (with Bλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L), their conjunc-
tion
∧
λ∈L
(
B↑λ, Sλ
)
is defined by
∧
λ∈L
(
B↑λ, Sλ
)
:=
((⋂
λ∈LB
↑
λ
)
, supλ∈L Sλ
)
. Note,
that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then we have(⋂
λ∈LB
↑
λ
)
=
(⋂
λ∈L
((
rSSλ
)−1
(Bλ)
))↑
. Again, abusing notation, we write
∧
λ∈LB
↑
λ :=⋂
λ∈LB
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol ∩
interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ′) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if
and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S ′  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if S ′  S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) as long as we keep
in mind that in the case of E = ∅S we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F ). It follows
from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only
when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ).
The disjunction of
{
B↑λ
}
λ∈L
is defined by the de Morgan law
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ = ¬
(∧
λ∈L ¬
(
B↑λ
))
.
Typically
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ $
⋃
λ∈LB
↑
λ, and if all Bλ are nonempty we have that
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ =⋃
λ∈LB
↑
λ holds if and only if all the B
↑
λ have the same base-space.
For each individual i ∈ I there is a possibility correspondence Πi : Σ → 2Σ with the
following properties:
0. Confinedness: If s ∈ S then Πi(s) ⊆ S ′ for some S ′  S.
1. Generalized Reflexivity: s ∈ Π↑i (s) for every s ∈ Σ.6
2. Stationarity: s′ ∈ Πi (s) implies Πi (s′) = Πi (s).
3. Projections Preserve Awareness: If s ∈ S ′, s ∈ Πi(s) and S  S ′ then sS ∈ Πi (sS).
4. Projections Preserve Ignorance: If s ∈ S ′ and S  S ′ then Π↑i (s) ⊆ Π↑i (sS).
6Here and in what follows, we abuse notation slightly and write Π↑i (ω) for (Πi(ω))
↑.
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5. Projections Preserve Knowledge: If S  S ′  S ′′, s ∈ S ′′ and Πi(s) ⊆ S ′ then
(Πi (s))S = Πi (sS).
For 5., we could have assumed ⊇ and deduce = from ⊇, 3., and the other properties.
Remark 3 Generalized Reflexivity implies that if S ′  S, s ∈ S and Πi(s) ⊆ S ′, then
rSS′ (s) ∈ Πi(s). In particular, we have Πi(s) 6= ∅, for all s ∈ Σ.
Remark 4 Property 4 and Confinedness imply that if S ′  S, s ∈ S and Πi(sS′) ⊆ S ′′,
then Πi(s) ⊆ S∗ for some S∗ with S ′′  S∗.
Remark 5 Property 5 and Confinedness imply Property 3.
Generalized Reflexivity and Stationarity are the analogues of the partitional prop-
erties of the possibility correspondence in partitional information structures. In par-
ticular, Generalized Reflexivity will yield the truth property (that what an individual
knows indeed obtains – property (iii) in Proposition 9); Stationarity will guarantee the
introspection properties (that an individual knows what she knows – property (iv) in
Proposition 9, and that an individual knows what she ignores provided she is aware of it
– property 5. in Proposition 10).
Properties 3. to 5. guarantee the coherence of the knowledge and the awareness of
individuals down the lattice structure . They compare the possibility sets of an individual
in a state s and its projection sS. The properties guarantee that, first, at the projected
state sS the individual knows nothing she does not know at s, and second, at the projected
state sS the individual is not aware of anything she is unaware of at s (Projections
Preserve Ignorance). Third, at the projected state sS the individual knows every event
she knows at s, provided that this event is based in a space lower than or equal to S
(Projections Preserve Knowledge). Fourth, at the projected state sS the individual is
aware of every event she is aware of at s, provided that this event is based in a space
lower than or equal to S (Projections Preserve Awareness).
Definition 18 The tuple
Σ :=
〈
(Sα)α∈A ,
(
rSαSβ
)
SβSα
, (Πi)i∈I
〉
,
is called an unawareness structure for the set of individuals I.
Definition 19 The knowledge operator of individual i on events E is defined, as usual,
by
Ki(E) := {s ∈ Σ : Πi (s) ⊆ E} ,
if there is a state s such that Πi (s) ⊆ E, and by
Ki(E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
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The following two propositions are proved in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a):
Proposition 8 If E is an event, then Ki(E) is an S(E)-based event.
Proposition 9 The Knowledge operator Ki has the following properties:
(i) Necessitation: Ki(Σ) = Σ,
(ii) Conjunction: Ki
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
=
⋂
λ∈LKi (Eλ),
(iii) Truth: Ki(E) ⊆ E,
(iv) Positive Introspection: Ki(E) ⊆ KiKi(E),
(v) Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(F ),
(vi) ¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E) ⊆ ¬Ki¬Ki¬Ki(E).
Proposition 9 says that the knowledge operator has all the strong properties of knowl-
edge in partitional information structures, except for the weakening (vi) of the negative
introspection property. Negative introspection – the property ¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ki¬Ki(E) that
when an individual does not know an event, she knows she does not know it – obtains only
when the individual is also aware of the event (see property 5 of the next proposition).
Definition 20 The unawareness operator of individual i from events to events is defined
by
Ui(E) = ¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E),
and the awareness operator is then naturally defined by
Ai(E) = ¬Ui(E).
This is the Modica-Rustichini (1999) definition. In particular, the Dekel-Lipman-
Rustichini (1998) Plausibility requirement Ui(E) ⊆ ¬Ki(E)∩¬Ki¬Ki(E) is satisfied by
this definition.
By Proposition 8 and the definition of the negation, we have
Ai(E) = Ki(E) ∪Ki¬Ki(E).
The following proposition is proved in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a):
Proposition 10 The following properties of knowledge and awareness obtain:
1. KU Introspection: KiUi(E) = ∅S(E),
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2. AU Introspection: Ui(E) = UiUi(E),
3. Weak Necessitation: Ai(E) = Ki
(
S (E)↑
)
,
4. Strong Plausibility: Ui(E) =
⋂∞
n=1 (¬Ki)n (E),
5. Weak Negative Introspection: ¬Ki(E) ∩ Ai¬Ki(E) = Ki¬Ki(E),
6. Symmetric: Ai(E) = Ai(¬E),
7. A-Conjunction:
⋂
λ∈LAi (Eλ) = Ai
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
,
8. AK-Self Reflection: Ai(E) = AiKi(E),
9. AA-Self Reflection: Ai(E) = AiAi(E),
10. A-Introspection: Ai(E) = KiAi(E).
Properties 1. to 4. have been proposed by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998),
properties 6. to 9. by Modica and Rustichini (1999), and properties 5. to 9. by
Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Halpern (2001). A-Introspection is the property that an
individual is aware of an event if and only if she knows she is aware of it.
Define an alternative awareness operator,
A˜i(E) := {ω ∈ Σ : Πi(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑}
if there is a state ω such that Πi(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑, and by
A˜i(E) = ∅S(E)
otherwise. Then by weak necessitation, following remark is immediate:
Remark 6 If E is an event, then Ai(E) = A˜i(E).
Common knowledge can be defined in the usual way (see Aumann, 1999):
Definition 21 The “everybody knows” operator on events is defined by
K(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Ki(E).
The common knowledge operator on events is defined by
CK(E) =
∞⋂
n=1
Kn(E).
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Analogously we can define common awareness.
Definition 22 The “everybody is aware” operator on events is defined by
A(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Ai(E),
and the common awareness operator on events by
CA(E) =
∞⋂
n=1
(A)n (E).
The following proposition extends Remark 4 of Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a).
Proposition 11 Let E be an event. The following multi-agent properties obtain:
1. Ai(E) = AiAj(E),
2. Ai(E) = AiKj(E),
3. Ki(E) ⊆ AiKj(E),
4. A(E) = K(S(E)↑),
5. A(E) = CA(E),
6. K(E) ⊆ A(E),
7. CK(E) ⊆ CA(E),
8. CK(S(E)↑) ⊆ CA(E).
Proof. 1. By Proposition 8 and the definition of awareness operator, S(E) = S(Aj(E)).
Hence by weak necessitation, Ai(E) = AiAj(E).
2. By Proposition 8, S(E) = S(Kj(E)). Hence by weak necessitation, Ai(E) =
AiKj(E).
3. By definition of awareness, Ki(E) ⊆ Ai(E). By 2., Ki(E) ⊆ Ai(E) = AiKj(E).
4. By weak necessitation, A(E) =
⋂
i∈I Ai(E) =
⋂
i∈I Ki(S(E)
↑) = K(S(E)↑).
5. By 4. we have A(E) = K(S(E)↑). By Proposition 8 Ki(S(E)↑) is an S(E)-based
event for all i ∈ I. Hence ∩i∈IKi(S(E)↑) = K(S(E)↑) is S(E)-based. Hence S(A(E)) =
S(K(S(E)↑)) = S(E). Therefore AA(E) = K(S(A(E))↑) = K(S(E)↑) = A(E). By
induction it follows that An+1(E) = AAn(E) = AA(E) = A(E) for all n = 1, 2, ....
Hence CA(E) =
⋂
n=1,2,...A
n(E) = A(E).
6. By definition, s ∈ K(E) iff s ∈ Ki(E) for all i ∈ I. Hence by definition of
awareness, we have s ∈ Ai(E) for all i ∈ I, and thus s ∈ A(E).
7. By definition, CK(E) ⊆ K(E). By 6., CK(E) ⊆ A(E). By 5., CK(E) ⊆ CA(E).
8. By definition, CK(S(E)↑) ⊆ K¯(S(E)↑). By 4., CK(S(E)↑) ⊆ A(E). By 5.,
CK(S(E)↑) ⊆ CA(E). 
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. According to Axiom (4), kiϕ→ kikiϕ and ki¬kiϕ→ kiki¬kiϕ
are theorems. Since ((p→ q) ∧ (r → s)) → ((p ∨ r)→ (q ∨ s)) is a tautology, we have
by Conjunction and Modus Ponens that (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) → (kikiϕ ∨ kiki¬kiϕ) is a the-
orem. The formulas kiϕ → (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) and ki¬kiϕ → (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) are instances
of tautologies. By RK kikiϕ → ki (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) and kiki¬kiϕ → ki (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) are
theorems. Since ((q → t) ∧ (s→ t)) → ((q ∨ s)→ t) is tautology, we have by Conjunc-
tion and Modus Ponens that (kikiϕ ∨ kiki¬kiϕ) → ki (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) is a theorem. By
Implication, it follows that (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ)→ ki (kiϕ ∨ ki¬kiϕ) is a theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Clear by induction on the formation of the formulas using
the propositional awareness axioms and the fact that the following is a tautology of the
propositional calculus (for every natural number n ≥ 1):((
r ↔
n∧
i=1
qi
)
∧
(
n∧
i=1
(qi ↔ pi)
)
→
(
r ↔
n∧
i=1
pi
))
.

Proof of Proposition 2. If ϕ is theorem then, since ϕ→ (aiϕ→ ϕ) is an instance of
a valid formula of PC, by Modus Ponens aiϕ → ϕ is also a theorem. By RK-Inference
kiaiϕ→ kiϕ is a theorem. Since aiϕ→ kiaiϕ is a theorem, it follows by Implication that
aiϕ→ kiϕ is a theorem. 
The following lemmata are standard and are used in the article repeatedly.
Lemma 6 Let Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 be a an inconsistent set of formulas, with Γ1, Γ2 both non-
empty. Then there are finitely many formulas ϕ1, ..., ϕn ∈ Γ1 and ψ1, ..., ψm ∈ Γ2 such
that (
∧n
i=1 ϕi)→ ¬ (
∧m
k=1 ψk) is a theorem.
Lemma 7 Let Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 be nonempty sets of formulas, each closed under conjunctions,
such that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3 is inconsistent. Then there exist ϕ ∈ Γ1, ψ ∈ Γ2 and χ ∈ Γ3 such
that ` ϕ ∧ ψ → ¬χ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Clear by compactness and Zorn’s Lemma (note that by compact-
ness the union of an increasing chain of consistent sets of formulas is consistent and an
upper bound of that chain). 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 3, rαβ is well-defined, and by Lemma 2, r
α
β is
surjective. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Consider α = Pr (ϕ) and B := {ωα ∈ Ωα | ϕ ∈ ωα}. If ω ∈ Ω
such that ϕ ∈ ω, then ω ∈ Ωβ for some β ⊇ α. Hence ω ∩Lα ∈ B, that is ω ∈ B↑, hence
we have shown that [ϕ] ⊆ B↑. Conversely ω ∈ B↑ implies that ω ∩Lα ∈ B, therefore we
have ϕ ∈ ω ∩ Lα, hence ϕ ∈ ω, that is ω ∈ [ϕ]. 
Proof of Proposition 5. By the Lemma on Propositional Awareness (Lemma 1) and
Lemma 6, we have aiϕ ∈ ω iff ai (x) ∈ ω for all x ∈ Pr (ϕ). By maximal consistency of
ω and Lemma 1, ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) has the property (ii). Note that kiϕ ∈ Lα implies aiϕ ∈ Lα.
Since kiϕ → aiϕ is theorem, kiϕ ∈ ω implies (by Lemma 6) aiϕ ∈ ω. Since kiϕ → ϕ
is a theorem, kiϕ ∈ ω implies (by Lemma 6) ϕ ∈ ω, hence by (ii): ϕ ∈ ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) and
ω ∈ Lα(ω,i) has property (i). Altogether, we have shown that ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) ∈ Πi (ω). 
Proof of Theorem 1. The nonemptyness follows from Proposition 5.
For 0., by (ii) and the Lemma on Propositional Awareness axioms we have Πi(ω) ⊆
Ωα(ω,i).
Property 1. follows from ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) ∈ Πi(ω).
For 2., let ω′ ∈ Πi(ω). We show first that Πi (ω′) ⊆ Πi (ω) : Let ω′′ ∈ Πi (ω′). If
kiϕ ∈ ω then, by the Axiom (4), we have, kikiϕ ∈ ω, hence kiϕ ∈ ω′ and therefore ϕ ∈ ω′′.
If aiϕ ∈ ω, then, we have kiaiϕ ∈ ω, therefore aiϕ ∈ ω′ and hence ϕ ∈ ω′′ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′′.
Conversely, (ϕ ∈ ω′′ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′′) implies aiϕ ∈ ω′ and therefore aiaiϕ ∈ ω. From the
Propositional Awareness Axioms, it follows that aiaiϕ → aiϕ is a theorem, and hence
by Modus Ponens, we have aiϕ ∈ ω. We have now shown that Πi (ω′) ⊆ Πi (ω). For the
reverse inclusion, let ω′′ ∈ Πi (ω). First we have to show that if kiϕ ∈ ω′ then ϕ ∈ ω′′.
Indeed, if kiϕ ∈ ω′, then aikiϕ ∈ ω and hence by Proposition 5 (kiϕ ∈ ω or ¬kiϕ ∈ ω)
and also aiϕ ∈ ω by Propositional Awareness. But ¬kiϕ ∈ ω together with aiϕ ∈ ω by
Lemma 4 and PC would imply ki¬kiϕ ∈ ω and hence ¬kiϕ ∈ ω′, a contradiction to the
consistency of ω′. Therefore, we have kiϕ ∈ ω and hence ϕ ∈ ω′′. Next, if aiϕ ∈ ω′, we
have aiaiϕ ∈ ω, hence aiϕ ∈ ω and therefore (ϕ ∈ ω′′ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′′). Conversely, (ϕ ∈ ω′′
or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′′) implies aiϕ ∈ ω and therefore, since aiϕ → kiaiϕ is a theorem, we have
kiaiϕ ∈ ω. But then we have aiϕ ∈ ω′. Altogether we have shown that Πi (ω) ⊆ Πi (ω′).
Property 3. needs not to be proved since it follows from the other properties (see
Remark 5).
For 4., if kiϕ ∈ ω ∩ Lα = ωα and ω′ ∈ Πi (ω) then ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩ Lα. Since ω′ ∈ Πi (ω), we
have that aiϕ ∈ ω ∩Lα if and only if (ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩Lα or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩Lα). Since we know that
ω′ ∩Lα ∈ Ω, we have first that ω′ ∩Lα ∈ Πi (ωα) and second that ω′ is the inverse image
of ω′ ∩ Lα under some projection.
For 5., let α ⊇ β ⊇ γ, ω ∈ Ωα, Πi(ω) ⊆ Ωβ. We have to show that ω′∩Lγ ∈ Πi (ωγ) =
Πi (ω ∩ Lγ). Indeed, if kiϕ ∈ ω ∩Lγ then ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩Lγ, and similarly if aiϕ ∈ ω ∩Lγ then
(ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩ Lγ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩ Lγ). And if (ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩ Lγ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′ ∩ Lγ) then aiϕ ∈ ω∩Lγ.
Conversely, if ω′γ ∈ Πi (ωγ) = Πi (ω ∩ Lγ), then (i) when kiϕ ∈ ω∩Lγ we have ϕ ∈ ω′γ
and (ii) aiϕ ∈ ω ∩ Lγ,
(
ϕ ∈ ω′γ or ¬ϕ ∈ ω′γ
)
.
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Let ω′γ ∈ Πi (ωγ) = Πi (ω ∩ Lγ). We have to show that there is a ω′β ∈ Πi (ω) such that(
ω′β
)
γ
= ω′γ. Consider the following set of formulas: Φ := ω
′
γ ∪ {kiϕ : kiϕ ∈ ω} ∪ {aiϕ :
aiϕ ∈ ω}. This set of formulas is contained in Lβ. If Φ is consistent, then it can be
extended to a maximal consistent set of formulas Ψ in the language Lβ, and it is easy to
see that Ψ ∈ Πi (ω).
Hence it remains to show the consistency of the set Φ. Assume by contradiction that
Φ is not consistent.
Note that {ϕ : kiϕ ∈ ω}, {ψ : aiψ ∈ ω} and ω′γ are all closed under conjunction, and
that (ai ∧ni=1 ψi) → ∧ni=1aiψi (by the awareness axioms) is a theorem. By RK inference
each (ki ∧mi=1 ϕi) → kjϕj is a theorem and by Conjunction, Modus Ponens and the fact
that (∧mi=1(p→ qi))→ (p→ ∧mi=1qi) is a valid formula of PC, we infer that (ki ∧mi=1 ϕi)→
∧mi=1kiϕi is a theorem.
Hence, by Lemma 7 there are ϕ, ψ and χ such that kiϕ ∈ ω, aiψ ∈ ω and χ ∈ ω′γ
with ` kiϕ ∧ aiψ → ¬χ. Obviously, we have then (since (p→ r) → ((p ∧ q)→ r)
is a tautology of PC) that ` kiϕ ∧ aiψ ∧ aiχ → ¬χ, and hence by RK-Inference
that ` kikiϕ ∧ kiaiψ ∧ kiaiχ → ki¬χ. The formulas kiϕ → kikiϕ, aiψ → kiaiψ and
aiχ → kiaiχ are all theorems. By applying two times Conjunction, the fact that
(((
∧n
i=1 qi)→ r) ∧ (
∧n
i=1 (pi → qi))→ ((
∧n
i=1 pi)→ r)) is a tautology of PC and by ap-
plying Modus Ponens we infer that kiϕ ∧ aiψ ∧ aiχ→ ki¬χ is a theorem.
But since kiϕ, aiψ, aiχ ∈ ωβ and since ωβ is a maximal consistent set of formulas in
the language Lβ, it follows that ki (¬χ) ∈ ωβ.We have ki (¬χ) ∈ ωγ = ωβ ∩Lγ and hence
¬χ ∈ ω′γ, a contradiction to χ ∈ ω′γ. 
Proof of Theorem 2. The first two items are straightforward.
For the third, suppose first that ω ∈ [kiϕ], i.e., kiϕ ∈ ω. We have to show that
Πi(ω) ⊆ [ϕ]. But this follows immediately from (i) in the definition of Πi(ω).
For the reverse direction, suppose that ω ∈ Ki [ϕ], i.e., Πi(ω) ⊆ [ϕ]. In other words,
∀ω′ ∈ Πi(ω) we have ϕ ∈ ω′.
Suppose, by contradiction, that kiϕ /∈ ω. Since ω is maximally consistent in the
sub-language built with all the primitive propositions in ϕ, we have ¬kiϕ ∈ ω. Note
that aiϕ ∈ ω by (ii). Since aiϕ → kiaiϕ is a theorem in the language of ω, we have
kiaiϕ ∈ ω. This implies aiϕ ∈ keni (ω), where keni (ω) := {ψ : kiψ ∈ ω}. Observe that
{ψ : kiψ ∈ ω} is closed under conjunctions (this follows from the derived axiom (C)).
Now, if keni (ω) ∪ {¬ϕ} were inconsistent, then, by Lemma 3 and the fact that
keni (ω) is closed under conjunctions, ψ → ϕ would be a theorem of the system for some
ψ ∈ keni (ω). And then also ψ ∧ aiϕ→ ϕ would be a theorem in the language of ω. By
RK-Inference, this implies that kiψ∧kiaiϕ→ kiϕ is a theorem in the language of ω. But
then we would have kiϕ ∈ ω in contrast with our assumption. Hence keni (ω) ∪ {¬ϕ} is
consistent. But if keni (ω)∪{¬ϕ} is consistent, then we can extend keni (ω)∪{¬ϕ} to a
maximally consistent ω′ in the sub-language of the elements of Πi(ω). By the definition
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of Πi(ω), we have ω
′ ∈ Πi(ω), a contradiction to the assumption Πi(ω) ⊆ [ϕ]. 
Proof of Corollary 3. This follows directly from Corollary 1, Proposition 4, Defini-
tion 6, Theorem 2 and Definition 10. 
Proof of Lemma 5. The “only if” is clear, since for all s ∈ M (Σ) we do have
(Σ, s) |= ϕ or (Σ, s) |= ¬ϕ. For the other direction, suppose that Γ 2Σ ϕ and that for
all s ∈ M (Σ) : (Σ, s) |= Γ implies (Σ, s) |= ϕ. Then there is a state space S and a state
s ∈ S such that (Σ, s) |= Γ and (Σ, s) |= ¬ϕ. Since the projections are onto, there is a
w ∈M (Σ) such that wS = s. Since the set [ψ] is an event, for every formula ψ, we have
(Σ, w) |= Γ and (Σ, w) |= ¬ϕ, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6. To show strong soundness it is enough to show
1. that all axioms are valid formulas,
2. that the set of valid formulas is closed under RK-Inference, and
3. that for every state in every unawareness model the set of formulas that are true
in that state is closed under Modus Ponens.
We first show 1:
To show that a formula ϕ is valid, by the above Lemma, it is enough to show that
(Σ, s) |= ϕ for every unawareness model Σ and every s ∈M (Σ) . It is clear (and standard)
that if ϕ is a substitution instance of a valid formula, then we have (Σ, s) |= ϕ for every
unawareness model Σ and every s ∈ M (Σ). Using the definition of the relation |=, the
validity of the Axiom of Truth follows from iii) of Proposition 9 and the validity of the
Axiom of Positive Introspection is a consequence of iv) of Proposition 9. The validity of
the first and the second Awareness Axiom follows from 6 and 7 of Proposition 10. By
Proposition 11 (2.), Ai (E) = AiKj (E). This implies, by the definition of the relation
|=, the validity of the third Awareness Axiom.
Now we turn to 2: Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn and ϕ be formulas with Pr (ϕ) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Pr (ϕi)
such that ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 ∧ ...∧ϕn → ϕ is a valid formula. Since Pr (ϕ) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Pr (ϕi) , we have
that ϕ is defined whenever ϕ1∧ϕ2∧ ...∧ϕn is defined. Since ϕ1∧ϕ2∧ ...∧ϕn → ϕ is valid,
we do have [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn] ⊆ [ϕ] in every unawareness model. By v) of Proposition 9,
we do have Ki ([ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn]) ⊆ Ki ([ϕ]). By Theorem 2, the definition (of |=) and
ii) of Proposition 9, we have [ki (ϕ1) ∧ ki (ϕ2) ∧ ... ∧ ki (ϕn)] = Ki ([ϕ1])∩Ki ([ϕ2])∩ ...∩
Ki ([ϕn]) = Ki [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn] ⊆ Ki ([ϕ]) = [ki (ϕ)] in every unawareness model. This
implies that kiϕ1 ∧ kiϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ kiϕn → kiϕ is true whenever it is defined and hence that
kiϕ1 ∧ kiϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ kiϕn → kiϕ is valid.
Last we verify 3: Let Σ be an unawareness model, s ∈ Σ, (Σ, s) |= ϕ, and (Σ, s) |=
ϕ → ψ. We have to show that (Σ, s) |= ψ. By the definition, we have s ∈ [ϕ] and
23
s ∈ [ψ] ∨ ¬ [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ] ∪ ¬ [ϕ], hence s ∈ [ψ] and therefore (Σ, s) |= ψ. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The “if” follows from soundness of our axioms and inference
rules, i.e., Proposition 6.
For “only if” let Γ |= ϕ :
case 1.: Assume that Γ∪{¬ϕ} is inconsistent. Then, by Lemma 6 there are ψ1,...,ψn ∈
Γ such that ψ ∧ ... ∧ ψn → ¬ (¬ϕ) is a theorem. Hence, by Conjunction, Modus Ponens
and Propositional Calculus, we have that Γ ` ϕ.
case 2.: Assume that Γ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. By Lemma 2 there is a maximal consis-
tent set of formulas ω ⊆ L with Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊆ ω. By definition, we have that ω ∈ ΩX . By
Corollary 3, for every formula χ ∈ L we have (Ω, ω) |= χ if and only if χ ∈ ω. It follows
that (Ω, ω) |= Γ∪{¬ϕ}, which is a contradiction to Γ |= ϕ. Hence we have that Γ∪{¬ϕ}
is inconsistent and therefore, by Case 1, Γ ` ϕ. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Let Γ have a model (Σ, s). Since the set of states where a
formula is true is an event, we can assume that s ∈ M (Σ). If Γ is inconsistent, then
Γ ` ¬ϕ and Γ ` ϕ for some formula ϕ. Since in s all formulas are defined, it follows
by the strong soundness that (Σ, s) |= ¬ϕ and (Σ, s) |= ϕ, which is impossible (by the
definition of |=). Therefore Γ is consistent.
Let Γ be consistent. If Γ has no model, then by the definitions, we have that Γ |= ¬>
and Γ |= >. But then, by the strong completeness, we have Γ ` ¬> and Γ ` > and Γ is
inconsistent, a contradiction. Hence, Γ has a model. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Obviously, LY -consistency of Γ implies LZ-consistency of Γ.
By Corollary 4 (applied to the case X = Z), the LZ-consistency of Γ implies that
there is a unawareness structure Σ, an evaluation function vZ : Z → E and a state s ∈ Σ
such that (ΣvZ , s) |= Γ. Define vY : Y → E by vY (x) := vZ (x) for x ∈ Z, and vY (x)
arbitrary for x ∈ Y \Z. Then it is easy to see that (ΣvY , s) |= Γ. By Corollary 4 (applied
to the case X = Y ), it follows that Γ is LY -consistent. 
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